



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

REGION III
2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210
LISLE, IL 60532-4352

November 4, 2008

Mr. Charles G. Pardee
President and Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO), Exelon Nuclear
Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO), AmerGen Energy Company, LLC
4300 Winfield Road
Warrenville IL 60555

SUBJECT: LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2
NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000373/2008004;
05000374/2008004

Dear Mr. Pardee:

On September 30, 2008, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an integrated inspection at your LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the results of this inspection, which were discussed on October 2, 2008, with Site Vice President, Mr. Daniel Enright, and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no NRC-identified or self-revealed findings of safety significance were identified. There were no findings involving a violation of NRC requirements.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system

C. Pardee

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Sincerely,

/RA/

Kenneth Riemer, Chief
Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374
License Nos. NPF-11; NPF-18

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000373/2008004; 05000374/2008004
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: Site Vice President - LaSalle County Station
Plant Manager - LaSalle County Station
Regulatory Assurance Manager - LaSalle County Station
Chief Operating Officer and Senior Vice President
Senior Vice President - Midwest Operations
Senior Vice President - Operations Support
Vice President - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs
Director - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs
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Assistant Attorney General
J. Klinger, State Liaison Officer,
Illinois Emergency Management Agency
Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission

C. Pardee

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Director - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs
Manager Licensing - Braidwood, Byron and LaSalle
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SUBJECT: LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2
NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000373/2008004;
05000374/2008004

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket Nos: 05000373; 05000374
License Nos: NPF-11; NPF-18

Report No: 05000373/2008004; 05000374/2008004

Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC

Facility: LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2

Location: Marseilles, Illinois

Dates: July 1, 2008 through September 30, 2008

Inspectors: G. Roach, Senior Resident Inspector
F. Ramírez, Resident Inspector
C. Scott, Region III Branch 2 Reactor Engineer
A. Dunlop, Region III Senior Reactor Inspector
M. Jones, Region III Reactor Engineer
M. Mitchell, Region III Radiation Protection Inspector
N. Shah, Region III Branch 2 Project Engineer
J. Yesinowski, Illinois Dept. of Emergency Management

Observer: S. Edmonds, Region III Reactor Inspector

Approved by: Kenneth Riemer, Chief
Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000373/2008004, 05000374/2008004; 7/01/2008 – 9/30/2008; LaSalle County Station, Units 1 & 2; routine integrated report.

The inspection was conducted by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) resident inspectors and regional inspectors. The report covers a three-month period of resident inspection, and announced inspection in the areas of health physics, heat sink performance, and diesel generator performance testing. No findings of significance were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.

Inspector-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Licensee-Identified Violations

No violations of significance were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1

The unit began the inspection period operating at full power. On July 20, 2008, the unit was reduced to 82 percent for motor driven reactor feed pump and main turbine valve surveillance testing. The unit returned to full power that same day. On September 6, 2008, power was reduced to approximately 66 percent to perform control rod sequence exchange and scram time testing. Operation at full power resumed on September 7, 2008. On September 28, 2008, the unit was shutdown to perform repairs of a hydrogen leak on the main generator housing. The unit remained in mode 3 (hot shutdown) for the rest of the inspection period.

Unit 2

The unit began the inspection period operating at full power. On July 27, 2008, power was reduced to approximately 62 percent for channel distortion testing of all the interior rods. The unit was returned to full power that same day. On August 30, 2008, the unit commenced a reduction in power to 53 percent for control rod sequence exchange and feedwater pump turbine surveillances. The unit was returned to full power on August 31, 2008, where it remained until September 26, 2008. At this time, power was reduced to 55 percent for power suppression testing, control rod SCRAM time testing and channel distortion testing. Full power was restored on September 29, 2008, and the unit remained operating at or near full power for the rest of the inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness

1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

.1 Quarterly Partial System Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk-significant systems:

- Unit 2 low pressure core spray (LPCS);
- 2A standby liquid control (SLC) with 2B out-of-service; and
- 1A and 2A diesel generators (DG) and support systems with the 0 DG out of service.

The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk significance relative to the Reactor Safety Cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors attempted to identify any discrepancies that could impact the function of the system, and, therefore, potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Technical Specification (TS) requirements, outstanding work orders, condition reports, and the

impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have rendered the systems incapable of performing their intended functions. The inspectors also walked down accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no obvious deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the corrective action program (CAP) with the appropriate significance characterization. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

These activities constituted three partial system walkdown samples as defined in Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.04-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Semi-Annual Complete System Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

On August 27 through August 29, 2008, the inspectors performed a complete system alignment inspection of the fire protection system to verify the functional capability of the system. This system was selected because it was considered risk-significant in the licensee's probabilistic risk assessment. The inspectors walked down the system to review mechanical and electrical equipment line ups, electrical power availability, system pressure and temperature indications, as appropriate, component labeling, component lubrication, component and equipment cooling, hangers and supports, operability of support systems, and to ensure that ancillary equipment or debris did not interfere with equipment operation. A review of a sample of past and outstanding work orders (WOs) was performed to determine whether any deficiencies significantly affected the system function. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the CAP database to ensure that system equipment alignment problems were being identified and appropriately resolved. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

These activities constituted one complete system walkdown sample as defined in IP 71111.04-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

.1 Routine Resident Inspector Tours (71111.05Q)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns which were focused on availability, accessibility, and the condition of firefighting equipment in the following risk-significant plant areas:

- Fire Zone 7B3 0 DG Room;
- Fire Zone 4F2 Unit 2 Division 1 switchgear;
- Fire Zone 2G Unit 1 reactor building 710';
- Fire Zone 214 Unit 1 reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC)/LPCS; and
- Fire Zone 2B1 Unit 1 reactor building 820'.

The inspectors reviewed areas to assess if the licensee had implemented a fire protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within the plant, effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability, maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition, and had implemented adequate compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems, or features in accordance with the licensee's fire plan. The inspectors selected fire areas based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk as documented in the plant's Individual Plant Examination of External Events with later additional insights, their potential to impact equipment which could initiate or mitigate a plant transient, or their impact on the plant's ability to respond to a security event. Using the documents listed in the Attachment, the inspectors verified that fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use; that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed, that transient material loading was within the analyzed limits; and fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition. The inspectors also verified that minor issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensee's CAP. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

These activities constituted five quarterly fire protection inspection samples as defined in IP 71111.05-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07T)

.1 Triennial Review of Heat Sink Performance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operability determinations, completed surveillances, vendor manual information, associated calculations, performance test results and cooler inspection results associated with the 2B Residual Heat Removal (RHR) heat exchanger and the DG common to both units (0 DG) heat exchanger. These heat exchangers were

chosen based on their risk significance in the licensee's probabilistic safety analysis, their important safety-related mitigating system support functions and their relatively low margin.

For the 2B RHR and the 0 DG heat exchangers, the inspectors verified that testing, inspection, maintenance, and monitoring of biotic fouling and macrofouling programs were adequate to ensure proper heat transfer. This was accomplished by verifying the test method used was consistent with accepted industry practices, or equivalent, the test conditions were consistent with the selected methodology, the test acceptance criteria were consistent with the design basis values, and results of heat exchanger performance testing. The inspectors also verified that the test results appropriately considered differences between testing conditions and design conditions, the frequency of testing based on trending of test results was sufficient to detect degradation prior to loss of heat removal capabilities below design basis values and test results considered test instrument inaccuracies and differences.

For the 2B RHR and the 0 DG heat exchanger, the inspectors reviewed the methods and results of heat exchanger performance inspections. The inspectors verified the methods used to inspect and clean heat exchangers were consistent with as-found conditions identified and expected degradation trends and industry standards, the licensee's inspection and cleaning activities had established acceptance criteria consistent with industry standards, and the as-found results were recorded, evaluated, and appropriately dispositioned such that the as-left condition was acceptable.

The inspectors verified the performance of the ultimate heat sink (UHS) and their subcomponents, including piping, intake screens, pumps, and valves, by tests or visual inspection to ensure availability and accessibility to the in-plant cooling water systems.

The inspectors reviewed the results of the licensee's inspection of the UHS weirs or excavations. The inspectors verified that identified settlement or movement indicating loss of structural integrity and/or capacity was appropriately evaluated and dispositioned by the licensee. In addition, the inspectors verified the licensee ensured sufficient reservoir capacity by trending and removing debris or sediment buildup in the UHS.

The inspectors performed a system walkdown of the service water intake structure to verify the licensee's assessment on structural integrity and component functionality. This included the verification that licensee ensured proper functioning of traveling screens and strainers, and structural integrity of component mounts. In addition, the inspectors verified that service water pump bay silt accumulation is monitored, trended, and maintained at an acceptable level by the licensee, and that water level instruments are functional and routinely monitored. The inspectors also verified the licensee's ability to ensure functionality during adverse weather conditions.

In addition, the inspectors reviewed condition reports related to the heat exchangers/coolers and heat sink performance issues to verify that the licensee had an appropriate threshold for identifying issues and to evaluate the effectiveness of the corrective actions. The documents reviewed are included in the Attachment to this report.

These inspection activities constituted two heat sink inspection samples as defined in IP 71111.07-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)

.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review (71111.11Q)

a. Inspection Scope

On September 16, 2008, the inspectors observed a crew of licensed operators in the plant's simulator during licensed operator requalification examinations to verify that operator performance was adequate, evaluators were identifying and documenting crew performance problems, and training was being conducted in accordance with licensee procedures. The inspectors evaluated the following areas:

- licensed operator performance;
- crew's clarity and formality of communications;
- ability to take timely actions in the conservative direction;
- prioritization, interpretation, and verification of annunciator alarms;
- correct use and implementation of abnormal and emergency procedures;
- control board manipulations;
- oversight and direction from supervisors; and
- ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions and Emergency Plan actions and notifications.

The crew's performance in these areas was compared to pre-established operator action expectations and successful critical task completion requirements. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted one quarterly licensed operator requalification program sample as defined in IP 71111.11.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)

.1 Routine Quarterly Evaluations (71111.12Q)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated degraded performance issues involving the following risk significant systems/components:

- Circulating water system; and
- Maintenance rule functional failure assessment for control rod drive (CRD) pressure control bypass valve 1C11-F004.

The inspectors reviewed events such as where ineffective equipment maintenance had resulted in valid or invalid automatic actuations of engineered safeguards systems and independently verified the licensee's actions to address system performance or condition problems in terms of the following:

- implementing appropriate work practices;
- identifying and addressing common cause failures;
- scoping of systems in accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 10 CFR 50.65(b) of the maintenance rule;
- characterizing system reliability issues for performance;
- charging unavailability for performance;
- trending key parameters for condition monitoring;
- ensuring 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification or re-classification; and
- verifying appropriate performance criteria for structures, systems, and components (SSCs)/functions classified as (a)(2) or appropriate and adequate goals and corrective actions for systems classified as (a)(1).

The inspectors assessed performance issues with respect to the reliability, availability, and condition monitoring of the system. In addition, the inspectors verified maintenance effectiveness issues were entered into the CAP with the appropriate significance characterization. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted two quarterly maintenance effectiveness samples as defined in IP 71111.12-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)

.1 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation and management of plant risk for the maintenance and emergent work activities affecting risk-significant and safety-related equipment listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were performed prior to removing equipment for work:

- Unit 1 motor-driven reactor feed pump protected pathway;
- Unit 2 electro-hydraulic control (EHC) filter emergent replacement;
- 2B non-essential service water jockey pump suction pipe thru-wall flaw; and
- 1B DG protected pathway.

These activities were selected based on their potential risk significance relative to the Reactor Safety Cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that risk assessments were performed as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and were accurate and complete. When emergent work was performed, the inspectors verified that the plant risk was promptly reassessed and managed. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work, discussed the results of the assessment with the licensee's

probabilistic risk analyst or shift technical advisor, and verified plant conditions were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed TS requirements and walked down portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met.

These maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control activities constituted four samples as defined in IP 71111.13-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

.1 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following issues:

- Division 3 125VDC battery testing procedural adequacy;
- Unit 1 under vessel high temperature conditions;
- Generic Letter 08-01 emergency core cooling system gas entrainment assessment;
- 1C low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) suction valve thermal overload setpoint adjustment; and
- Core standby cooling system (CSCS) operability following hypothesized internal flooding with actual high cooling lake levels (greater than 701' elevation).

The inspectors selected these potential operability issues based on the risk-significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that TS operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the TS and Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) to the licensee's evaluations, to determine whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. The inspectors determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations. Additionally, the inspectors also reviewed a sampling of corrective action documents to verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This operability inspection constituted five samples as defined in IP 71111.15-05

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18)

.1 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the containment ventilation (VP) chiller compressor trip bypass feature modification. They compared the temporary configuration changes and associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening and evaluation information against the design basis, the UFSAR, and the TS, as applicable, to verify that the modification did not affect the operability or availability of the affected system. The inspectors also compared the licensee's information to operating experience information to ensure that lessons learned from other utilities had been incorporated into the licensee's decision to implement the temporary modification. Lastly, the inspectors discussed the temporary modification with operations and engineering personnel to ensure that the individuals were aware of how extended operation with the temporary modification in place could impact overall plant performance. This temporary modification was approved for installation but had not yet been installed by the licensee by the close of this inspection period.

This inspection constituted one temporary modification sample as defined in IP 71111.18-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (71111.19)

.1 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following PMT activities to verify that procedures and test activities were adequate to ensure system operability and functional capability:

- Drywell equipment drain sump outlet valve testing after emergent maintenance;
- 2B DG starting air compressor discharge check valve testing;
- 1C LPCI motor operated valve strokes following planned electrical breaker maintenance;
- 1B residual heat removal (RH) pump and valve run and strokes following planned electrical breaker maintenance; and
- 0 DG emergency fast start following a planned upkeep window.

These activities were selected based upon the structure, system, or component's ability to impact risk. The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following (as applicable): the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed; testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness; test instrumentation was appropriate; tests were performed as written in accordance with properly reviewed and approved procedures; equipment was returned to its operational status following testing (temporary modifications or jumpers required for test performance were properly removed after test completion), and test

documentation was properly evaluated. The inspectors evaluated the activities against TS, the UFSAR, 10 CFR Part 50 requirements, licensee procedures, and various NRC generic communications to ensure that the test results adequately ensured that the equipment met the licensing basis and design requirements. In addition, the inspectors reviewed corrective action documents associated with PMT to determine whether the licensee was identifying problems and entering them in the CAP and that the problems were being corrected commensurate with their importance to safety. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted five PMT samples as defined in IP 71111.19-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

.1 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the test results for the following activities to determine whether risk-significant systems and equipment were capable of performing their intended safety function and to verify testing was conducted in accordance with applicable procedural and TS requirements:

- LOS-R1-Q5; RCIC cold quick start (Routine);
- LOS-SQ-Q1 2B SLC pump and valve quarterly (Routine);
- LOS-VC-SR1 Control room and auxiliary electric equipment room ventilation pressurization surveillance (Routine);
- 2B RHR quarterly American Society of Mechanical Engineers surveillance (IST); and
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 drywell equipment drains (identified leakage) and drywell floor drains (unidentified leakage) surveillances (RCS).

The inspectors observed in plant activities and reviewed procedures and associated records to determine the following:

- did preconditioning occur;
- were the effects of the testing adequately addressed by control room personnel or engineers prior to the commencement of the testing;
- were acceptance criteria clearly stated, demonstrated operational readiness, and consistent with the system design basis;
- plant equipment calibration was correct, accurate, and properly documented;
- as-left setpoints were within required ranges; and the calibration frequency were in accordance with TSs, the USAR, procedures, and applicable commitments;
- measuring and test equipment calibration was current;
- test equipment was used within the required range and accuracy; applicable prerequisites described in the test procedures were satisfied;

- test frequencies met TS requirements to demonstrate operability and reliability; tests were performed in accordance with the test procedures and other applicable procedures; jumpers and lifted leads were controlled and restored where used;
- test data and results were accurate, complete, within limits, and valid;
- test equipment was removed after testing;
- where applicable for inservice testing activities, testing was performed in accordance with the applicable version of Section XI, American Society of Mechanical Engineers code, and reference values were consistent with the system design basis;
- where applicable, test results not meeting acceptance criteria were addressed with an adequate operability evaluation or the system or component was declared inoperable;
- where applicable for safety-related instrument control surveillance tests, reference setting data were accurately incorporated in the test procedure;
- where applicable, actual conditions encountering high resistance electrical contacts were such that the intended safety function could still be accomplished;
- prior procedure changes had not provided an opportunity to identify problems encountered during the performance of the surveillance or calibration test;
- equipment was returned to a position or status required to support the performance of its safety functions; and
- all problems identified during the testing were appropriately documented and dispositioned in the CAP.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted three routine surveillance testing samples, one inservice testing sample, and one reactor coolant system leak detection inspection sample as defined in IP 71111.22, Sections -02 and -05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)

.1 Training Observation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector observed a simulator training evolution for licensed operators on September 16, 2008, which required emergency plan implementation by a licensee operations crew. This evolution was planned to be evaluated and included in performance indicator (PI) data regarding drill and exercise performance. The inspectors observed event classification and notification activities performed by the crew. The inspectors also attended the post-evolution critique for the scenario. The focus of the inspectors' activities was to note any weaknesses and deficiencies in the crew's performance and ensure that the licensee evaluators noted the same issues and entered them into the CAP. As part of the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the scenario package and other documents listed in the Attachment to this report.

This training inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71114.06-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2. RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01)

.1 Plant Walkdowns and Radiation Work Permit (RWP) Reviews

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the adequacy of the licensee's internal dose assessment process for internal exposures in excess of 50 millirem committed effective dose equivalent. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's physical and programmatic controls for highly activated and/or contaminated materials (non-fuel) stored within the spent fuel pool or other storage pools.

This occupational radiation safety plant walkdown and RWP review constituted two samples as defined in IP 71121.01-5.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Problem Identification and Resolution

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee documentation packages for all PI events occurring since the last inspection to determine if any of these PI events involved dose rates greater than 25 R/hr at 30 centimeters or in excess of 500 R/hr at 1 meter. Barriers were evaluated for failure and to determine if there were any barriers left to prevent personnel access. Unintended exposures exceeding 100 millirem total effective dose equivalent (or 5 Rem shallow dose equivalent or 1.5 Rem lens dose equivalent) were evaluated to determine if there were any regulatory overexposures or if there was a substantial potential for an overexposure.

This radiation safety licensee documentation inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71121.01-5.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2OS2 As-Low-As-Is-Reasonably-Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls (71121.02)

.1 Declared Pregnant Workers

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed dose records of declared pregnant workers for the current assessment period to verify that the exposure results and monitoring controls employed by the licensee complied with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for declared pregnant workers. The inspectors evaluated if that program complied with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20.

This ALARA declared pregnant workers inspection constituted one required sample as defined in IP 71121.02-5.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

.1 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours PI for Unit 1 and Unit 2 for the period from the 4th quarter 2007 through the 2nd quarter 2008. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance contained in the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 5 were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator narrative logs, issue reports, event reports and NRC Inspection Reports for the period of October 2007 through June 2008 to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted two unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours samples as defined in IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Unplanned Scrams with Complications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Unplanned Scrams with Complications PI for Unit 1 and Unit 2 for the period from the 4th quarter 2007 through

the 2nd quarter 2008. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance contained in the NEI Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 5, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator narrative logs, issue reports, event reports and NRC Integrated Inspection Reports for the period of October 2007 through June 2008 to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted two unplanned scrams with complications samples as defined in IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Unplanned Transients per 7000 Critical Hours

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Unplanned Transients per 7000 Critical Hours PI for Unit 1 and Unit 2 for the period from the 4th quarter 2007 through the 2nd quarter 2008. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance contained in the NEI Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 5, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator narrative logs, issue reports, maintenance rule records, event reports and NRC Integrated Inspection Reports for the period of October 2007 through June 2008 to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted two unplanned transients per 7000 critical hours samples as defined in IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the RCS Specific Activity PI for Unit 1 and Unit 2 for the period from the 4th quarter 2007 through the 2nd quarter 2008. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance contained in the NEI Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 5, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's RCS chemistry samples, TS requirements, issue reports, and event reports for the period of October 2007 through June 2008 to validate the accuracy of the submittals.

The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator, and none were identified. In addition to record reviews, the inspectors observed a chemistry technician obtain and analyze a reactor coolant system sample. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted two RCS specific activity samples as defined in IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.5 Reactor Coolant System Leakage

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the RCS Leakage PI for Unit 1 and Unit 2 for the period from the 4th quarter 2007 through the 2nd quarter 2008. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance contained in the NEI Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 5, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator logs, RCS leakage tracking data, issue reports, event reports and NRC Integrated Inspection Reports for the period of October 2007 through June 2008 to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted two RCS leakage samples as defined in IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.6 Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Occupational Radiological Occurrences PI for the period from the 3rd quarter 2007 through the 2nd quarter 2008. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance contained in the NEI Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 5, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's assessment of the PI for occupational radiation safety to determine if indicator related data was adequately assessed and reported. To assess the adequacy of the licensee's PI data collection and analyses, the inspectors discussed with radiation protection staff, the scope and breadth of its data review, and the results of those reviews. The inspectors independently reviewed electronic dosimetry dose rate and accumulated dose alarm and dose reports and the dose assignments for any intakes that occurred during the time period reviewed to determine if there were potentially unrecognized occurrences. The inspectors also conducted walkdowns of numerous

locked high and very high radiation area entrances to determine the adequacy of the controls in place for these areas. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted one occupational radiological occurrences sample as defined in IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.7 Radiological Effluent TS/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Radiological Effluent TS (RETS)/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences PI for the period from the 3rd quarter 2007 through the 2nd quarter 2008. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions and guidance contained in the NEI Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 5, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's issue report database and selected individual reports generated since this indicator was last reviewed to identify any potential occurrences such as unmonitored, uncontrolled, or improperly calculated effluent releases that may have impacted offsite dose. The inspectors reviewed gaseous effluent summary data and the results of associated offsite dose calculations for selected dates between from the third quarter 2007 through the second quarter 2008, to determine if indicator results were accurately reported. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's methods for quantifying gaseous and liquid effluents and determining effluent dose. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's historical 10 CFR 50.75(g) file and selectively reviewed the licensee's analysis for discharge pathways resulting from a spill, leak, or unexpected liquid discharge focusing on those incidents which occurred over the last few years. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted one RETS/ODCM radiological effluent occurrences sample as defined in IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Physical Protection

.1 Routine Review of items Entered Into the CAP

a. Scope

As part of the various baseline inspection procedures discussed in previous sections of this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that they were being entered into the licensee's CAP at an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective actions, and that adverse trends were identified and addressed. Attributes reviewed included: the complete and accurate identification of the problem; that timeliness was commensurate with the safety significance; the evaluation and disposition of performance issues, generic implications, common causes, contributing factors, root causes, extent of condition reviews, and that previous occurrences reviews were proper and adequate. Also, the classification, prioritization, focus, and timeliness of corrective actions were reviewed to ensure they were commensurate with safety and sufficient to prevent recurrence of the issue. Minor issues entered into the licensee's CAP as a result of the inspectors' observations are included in the attached list of documents reviewed.

These routine reviews from IP 71152 for the identification and resolution of problems did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Instead, they were considered an integral part of the inspections performed during the quarter and documented in Section 1 of this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Daily CAP Reviews

a. Scope

In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensee's CAP. This review was accomplished through inspection of the station's daily condition report packages.

These daily reviews were performed as defined in IP 71152 as part of the inspectors' daily plant status monitoring activities and, as such, did not constitute any separate inspection samples.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Annual Review: Operator Workarounds (OWA)

a. Scope

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's implementation of their process used to identify, document, track, and resolve operational challenges. Inspection activities included, but were not limited to, a review of the cumulative effects of the OWAs on system availability and the potential for improper operation of the system, for potential impacts on multiple systems, and on the ability of operators to respond to plant transients or accidents.

The inspectors performed a review of the cumulative effects of OWAs. The documents listed in the Attachment were reviewed to accomplish the objectives of the inspection procedure. The inspectors also reviewed operator challenges, which create an obstacle to normal plant operation, rather than the more severe obstacle to safe plant operation created by an OWA. The inspectors reviewed both current and historical operational challenge records to determine whether the licensee was identifying operator challenges at an appropriate threshold, had entered them into their CAP and proposed or implemented appropriate and timely corrective actions which addressed each issue. Reviews were conducted to determine if any operator challenge could increase the possibility of an Initiating Event, if the challenge was contrary to training, required a change from long-standing operational practices, or created the potential for inappropriate compensatory actions. Additionally, all temporary modifications were reviewed to identify any potential effect on the functionality of Mitigating Systems, impaired access to equipment, or required equipment uses for which the equipment was not designed. Daily plant and equipment status logs, degraded instrument logs, and operator aids or tools being used to compensate for material deficiencies were also assessed to identify any potential sources of unidentified operator workarounds. In addition, interviews were conducted with equipment operators and licensed control room operators to determine if longstanding workarounds existed and had in turn been proceduralized into a part of accepted practice.

This operator workarounds annual inspection review constituted one sample as defined in IP 71152.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Annual Review: Safety-Related Procedure Changes

a. Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of approximately 100 issue reports associated with revisions to plant procedures that were associated with safety-related components or emergency operations to evaluate whether the licensee's process to identify, prioritize and resolve changes needed for those procedures was adequate. Specifically, the inspectors selected procedural changes for which the due dates were moved by more than six months and revisions that would directly impact Emergency Operating Procedures. The inspectors evaluated the validity of extending the due date on a needed revision of a safety-related procedure and ensured the revisions were timely and commensurate with the safety significance of the issue. Additionally, the inspectors

verified that established corrective actions by the licensee for the safety-related procedures were appropriately focused to correct the problem.

b. Observations

The inspectors noted that the licensee properly identified deficiencies in their procedures; however, the process for prioritizing and resolving the changes lacked some organization. Specifically, it was the responsibility of a few individuals from the Operations and Training departments to ensure that these procedure revisions were performed in a timely manner. The inspectors noticed that there was not a formal threshold or process to establish priorities for procedures needing modification other than personal discretion and foreseen or unforeseen events. Some examples of events that influenced the establishment of due dates were refueling outages, major equipment malfunctions and other NRC inspections.

The inspectors observed that the events that influenced the priority category and original due dates for the issue reports were also used as basis for adjusting the due dates when the actions required could not be completed in time. Additionally, the inspectors noted that in most of the issue reports with postponements, no written justification was provided for deferring the completion date. The inspectors interviewed the personnel in charge of these procedure changes to gather the information on each issue and assess whether the delays were handled in accordance with safety significance. From the sample selected, approximately 20 percent of the procedure changes required were deferred from the original due dates several times and in some cases they were pushed back by more than 6 months up to a year.

The inspectors concluded that the licensee identified necessary procedural changes commensurate with safety. However, due to the workload of personnel tasked with these changes, the prioritization and execution of these procedural revisions could improve by performing a more structured significance determination and by justifying due date rescheduling to better track the program. The inspectors did not identify any issues where the resolution timeliness of the issue report compromised the safety of plant operation.

This safety related procedural changes review constituted one inspection sample as defined in IP 71152.

c. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153)

.1 (Closed) LER 05000374/2008001-00, High Pressure Core Spray System Declared Inoperable Due to Failed Room Ventilation Supply Fan

a. Inspection Scope

On June 11, 2008, the supply fan for the Division 3 switchgear room ventilation system (VD) tripped unexpectedly. Division 3 switchgear supports the high pressure core spray (HPCS) system. High pressure core spray remained available to inject into the reactor

vessel if needed, but was declared inoperable due to potential room heat-up with the room's ventilation failed. As HPCS is a single train system, this failure resulted in a complete loss of system function, requiring the licensee to make an eight hour notification to the NRC under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). This event was also classified as a Safety System Functional Failure. The failure mechanism was identified by the licensee as a phase to ground short on the fan's motor winding. The licensee determined the apparent cause of the motor winding failure to be a lack of a time-based refurbishment/replacement program for high duty cycle (continuously run) motors. The motor in question received periodic greasing of its bearings and quarterly vibration analysis, but no refurbishment/ replacement schedule had been established. This component was from original construction (approximately 25 years old) and vendor environmental qualification records analyzed that this component was expected to last for the licensed lifetime of the plant (40 years).

During the apparent cause investigation, the licensee identified Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) guidance that revealed that high duty cycle motors in low power applications, such as ventilation fans, have been known to show signs of electrical degradation beginning at approximately 20 years of service. As a corrective action, the licensee established a 20 year refurbishment/replacement criteria for the supply fan in question. The licensee performed an extent of condition review of all 480 volt motors site wide extending the 20 year criterion to all critical (safety/risk significant), high duty cycle, single train, and short duration TS shutdown time clock (less than or equal to seven days) motor driven components. This expanded the motor population to four total components (the supply and return fans associated with each units Division 3 VD system). The inspectors' review of the EPRI operating experience showed it to be general in nature, lacking the specificity that would reasonably cause the licensee to reevaluate previous vendor lifetime qualification data and as such the failure to establish a refurbishment/replacement criteria based on industry experience was not considered a performance deficiency. Documents reviewed in this inspection are listed in the Attachment. This LER is closed.

This event follow-up review constituted one sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71153-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA5 Other

Cornerstone: Physical Protection

.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities

a. Inspection Scope

During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of security force personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with licensee security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security. These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours.

The inspectors also reviewed a report of the results of a survey of the site security organization relative to its safety conscious work environment. The inspectors considered whether the surveys were conducted in a manner that encouraged candid and honest feedback. The results were reviewed to determine whether adequate number of staff responded to the survey. The inspectors also reviewed Exelon's self-assessment of the survey results and verified that any issues or areas for improvement were entered into the CAP for resolution.

These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Rather, they were considered an integral part of the inspectors' normal plant status review and inspection activities.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Management Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

On October 2, 2008, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Site Vice President, Mr. Daniel Enright, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.

.2 Interim Exit Meetings

Interim exits were conducted for:

- The results of the heat sink performance inspection with the Plant Manager, Mr. D. Rhoades, on July 25, 2008; and
- The results of the radiation protection inspection with the Plant Manager, Mr. D. Rhodes, on August 29, 2008.

The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

D. Enright, Site Vice President
D. Rhoades, Plant Manager
J. Bashor, Site Engineering Director
L. Blunk, Operations Training Manager
S. Wilkinson, Chemistry Manager
H. Do, Corporate Inservice Inspection Manager
B. Ginter, Engineering Programs Manager
F. Gogliotti, System Engineering Senior Manager
W. Hilton, Engineering Supervisor – Mechanical/Structural
K. Ihnen, Nuclear Oversight Manager
A. Kochis, Inservice Inspection Engineer
R. Leasure, Radiation Protection Manager
S. Marik, Operations Director
J. Miller, NDE Level III
B. Rash, Maintenance Director
J. Rommel, Design Engineering Senior Manager
K. Rusley, Emergency Preparedness Manager
J. Shields, Inservice Inspection Program Supervisor
T. Simpkin, Regulatory Assurance Manager
H. Vinyard, Shift Operations Superintendent
G. Wilhelmsen, Design Manager
J. White, Site Training Director
C. Wilson, Station Security Manager
D. Amezaga, GL 89-13 Program Owner
J.C. Feeney, NOS Lead Assessor
D. Henly, Design Engineer

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

K. Riemer, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Opened

None.

Closed

05000374/2008001-00 LER High Pressure Core Spray System Declared Inoperable
Due to Failed Room Ventilation Supply Fan (4OA3)

Discussed

None.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a partial list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC inspector reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather that selected sections or portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

PROCEDURES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
LOP-DG-01E	Unit 1 A DG Electrical Checklist	8/21/1997
LOP-DG-01M	Unit 1 A DG Mechanical Checklist	6/12/2003
LOP-DG-04E	Unit 2 A DG Electrical Checklist	12/17/2002
LOP-DG-04M	Unit 2 A DG Mechanical Checklist	7/24/2002
LOP-DG-06M	Unit 1 A DG Cooling System Mechanical Checklist	2/14/2008
LOP-DG-09M	Unit 2 A DG Cooling System Mechanical Checklist	1/7/2008
LOP-DO-01M	Unit 1 A DG Fuel Oil transfer System Mechanical Checklist	10/27/1997
LOP-DO-07M	Unit 2 B DG Fuel Oil Transfer System Mechanical Checklist	9/12/1997
LOP-FP-01E	Unit 1 Fire Protection System Electrical Checklist	Rev. 10
LOP-FP-01M	Unit 0 Fire Protection System Mechanical Checklist	Rev. 17
LOP-FP-02E	Unit 2 Fire Protection System Electrical Checklist	Rev. 10
LOP-FP-02M	Unit 1 Fire Protection System Mechanical Checklist	Rev. 16
LOP-FP-03M	Unit 2 Fire Protection System Mechanical Checklist	Rev. 14
LOP-LP-02E	Unit 2 LPCS System Electrical Checklist	2/27/1999
LOP-LP-02M	Unit 2 LPCS System Mechanical Checklist	12/19/2007
LOP-SC-02E	Unit 2 SLC System Electrical Checklist	12/15/1998
LOP-SC-02M	Unit 2 SLC System Mechanical Checklist	12/15/1998

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
815684	NRC Walkdown Identified Concerns with FP Components	9/9/2008

DRAWINGS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
M-140	P & ID Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS)	AN
M-145	P & ID Standby Liquid Control System	AC

1R05 Fire Protection

MISCELLANEOUS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
Fire Pre-Plan 2B1	Rx. Bldg Unit 1 elev. 720' 6"	2/2/2006
Fire Pre-Plan 2G	Rx. Bldg Unit 1 elev. 710' 6"	2/2/2006
Fire Pre-Plan 2I4	Rx. Bldg Unit 1 elev. 673' LPCS/RCIC Pump Cubicle	2/2/2006
Fire Pre-Plan 4F2	Aux. Bldg Unit 2 Div. 1 ESS Switchgear Room EL. 710'	2/2/2006
Fire Pre-Plan 7B3	710' 0" DG Room	2/2/2006
LSCS-FPR, Table H3-2	Combustible Loading and Extinguishing Capability.	Rev. 3

1R07 Heat Sink Performance

PROCEDURES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
EC364648	Replace 0 DG Throttle Valve	Rev. 1
EC367805	Evaluation of the Standby DG Heat Exchanger (0, 1, and 2DG01A)	11/1/2007
ER-AA-340	GL 89-13 Program Implementing Procedure	Rev. 4
ER-AA-340-1001	GL 89-13 Program Implementation Instructional Guidance	Rev. 4
ER-AA-340-1002	Service Water Heat Exchanger and Component Inspection Guide	Rev. 3
LOA-DIKE-001	Lake Dike Damage/Failure	Rev. 8
LOA-UHS-001	Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink	Rev. 0
LOP-CW-09	Circulating Water System Ice Melting	Rev. 13
LTS-200-17	Unit 1 and 2 RHR HX Thermal Performance Monitoring Procedure	Rev. 10
LTS-600-23	CSCS Cooling Water Screen Bypass Supply Line and CW Pump Inlet Bays Inspection	Rev. 8
OE06-001	ODG006 Valve Stem Separation from Disc	Rev. 2

CAP DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
601993	2B RHR HX Did Not Pass VIAC	3/10/2007

CAP DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
603360	2B RHR HX As Left Inspection Not Performed by Engineering	3/13/2007
667676	Corp Engineer Review of LaSalle GL 89-13 Surveillances and Calcs	9/4/2007
712713	Dike Maintenance Needed	12/17/2007
800212	NRC Concern with ER-AA-340-1002	7/25/2008

WORK ORDERS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
355600	DG Cooler 0A Inspection	9/3/2002
484036-01	2B RHR Heat Exchanger Inspection	1/5/2003
585784	RHR Heat Exchanger Heat Transfer Test	1/13/2005
772867	Division 2 RHR Service Water Flow Balance Test	9/25/2006
780445	Inspection of South End of WS Tunnel for Corbicula and Sediment	10/6/2006
785667	Perform Hydrographic Survey of CSC Pond per LTS-1000-4	1/25/2007
821559	2B RHR Heat Exchanger Inspection	3/4/2007
835807	Inspection of North End of WS Tunnel for Corbicula and Sediment	5/23/2007
848774	Clean Unit 2 A CW Inlet Bay	1/19/2007
848775	Clean Unit 2 CW Inlet Bay	12/21/2006
848779	Clean Unit 1 A CW Inlet Bay and Bypass Line	1/5/2007
849191	Clean Unit 1 C CW Inlet Bay	12/14/2006
853781	Clean Unit 1 B CW Inlet Bay	1/24/2007
957093	LOS-DG-SR5, 0 DG Cooling Water System Flow Test	3/28/2008
1002838	Div II RHR WS Flow Test IAW LOS-RH-SR1	7/16/2007
1032211	Clean Unit 2 B CW Inlet Bay	3/13/2008

DRAWINGS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
	Contoured Depths Ultimate Heat Sink LaSalle County Station, Sheets 1 and 2	9/21/2006
Vetip binder J-0091	RHR Heat Exchangers	
S-67	Dike Sections and Details	Rev. G

MISCELLANEOUS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
EN-LA-402-0005	Extreme Heat Implementation Plan – LaSalle	Rev. 12
GL 89-13	Program Basis Document	Rev. 5
SEAG 97-000577	Evaluation of Potential Water Hammer Events Within the Core Standby Cooling System (CSCS) Equipment Cooling Water System	12/4/1997
WR990068110	RHR HX Heat Transfer Test	11/6/2000
WR990164133	DG Cooler 0A Inspection	2/19/2001

CALCULATIONS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
97-195	Thermal Model of ComEd/LaSalle Station Unit 0, 1, and 2 DG Jacket Water Coolers	Rev. A
97-201	Thermal Model of ComEd/LaSalle Station Unit 1 and 2 RHR Heat Exchangers RHR 01 A&B	Rev. A
L-000715	Evaluation of Potential Water Hammer Event on RHR HX SW(CSCS) Piping Subsystems	Rev. 0
L-000718	Determination of Potential Water Hammer at the RHR Heat Exchanger from a Postulated RHRSW Void Formation	Rev. 001A
L-000731	Evaluation of the RHR Heat Exchangers for Water Hammer Effect	Rev. 2A
L-001584	Volume of the Ultimate Heat Sink	Rev. 1
L-002404	CSCS Cooling Water System “Road Map” Calculation	Rev. 2b
L-002457	LaSalle County Station Ultimate Heat Sink Analysis	Rev. 5a
L-002857	RHR Heat Exchangers K Factor Sensitivity Study, 1(2) RHR 01 A&B	Rev. 000B
Proto Power Calculation 97-201	RHR Heat Exchanger Spec. Sheet/LaSalle Station Unit 1 and 2	Rev. A

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program

MISCELLANEOUS

ESG 93	Out of the Box Training Scenario	9/2008
ESG 94	Out of the Box Training Scenario	9/2008

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

PROCEDURES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
LGA-RD-01	Alternate Vessel Injection Using Both CRD Pumps	Rev. 9

CAP DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
559645	2B CW RTS	11/17/2006
569640	1C Circ Water Pump Trip	12/15/2006
570103	1A/1B CW Screens Running in Slow Speed with DP Low	12/15/2006
572545	Faulty TR1 Relay in 1C Circ Water Exciter Panel	12/15/2006
578017	Leak from Screen Wash Spraying Out onto Floor	1/11/2007
578368	Circ Water (CW) has met its maint. rule reliability criteria	1/12/2007
589768	Unexplained U1 and U2 CW Flow Changes	2/9/2007
608413	U-1 C CW Pump tripped on Start	3/24/2007
613901	L2R11 LL to Apply to L1R12 for the CW System	4/6/2007
619180	Unit-1 CW Exceeds Maint Rule Reliability Target	4/19/2007
620755	Foreign Material Found Lodged in Pump Impeller	4/23/2007
623904	Traveling Screen Nozzle Plugged	5/1/2007
626910	Interim Corrective Actions for CW Pump Motor Trips	5/18/2007
643422	M.R. (A)(1) Determination Paper Work Not Completed on Time	6/22/2007
734960	1C11-F004 CRD Drive Water PCV Bypass Could Not be Opened	2/12/2008
740876	1A Circ. Water Pump Slip Guard Relay Tripped During Start	2/25/2008
777914	Received 'Circ Wtr Pmp Dsch Vlv fail to open alarm'	5/21/2008
797547	Trip of 1A Circ Water Pump	7/17/2008
800641	1CW093A Pump Leak	7/27/2008
808472	VQ Inerting Line badly Corroded and Needs Repainting	8/19/2008
808504	Rebuilt Check Valve is Non-Conformance	8/19/2008
809238	Circ Water MRFF status	8/20/2008
809641	Work on CW Pumps was moved out several times	8/21/2008

MISCELLANEOUS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
	BWR Delphi Form	
	Maintenance Rule Expert Panel Meeting Agenda	1/31/2008
	Maintenance Rule Expert Panel Meeting Agenda	5/15/2008
	Maintenance Rule Expert Panel Meeting Agenda	5/17/2007
	Maintenance rule Functional Failure Evaluation	3/13/2008
	Maintenance Rule Performance Criteria RD-02: Functional Failure includes failure of a CRD pump or failure of the flow path specified in LGA-RD-01	5/8/2008
	Maintenance Rule Scoping for RD-02	5/8/2008
	Performance Criteria – Unavailability Criteria - CW	8/11/2008
	Performance Monitoring – Reliability CW-01 Unit 1	8/2006 - 8/2008
	Performance Monitoring – Reliability CW-01 Unit 2	8/2006 - 8/2008
	Performance Monitoring – Reliability Details CW Unit 1	8/2006 - 8/2008
	Performance Monitoring – Unavailability CW-01 Unit 1	8/2006 - 8/2008
	Performance Monitoring – Unavailability CW-01 Unit 2	8/2006 - 8/2008
	Performance Monitoring Summary – CW Reliability	
	Scoping and Risk Significance – Scoping – CW	8/11/2008
	Scoping/Risk Significance Detailed Report: CW Circulating Water	4/28/2005

WORK REQUESTS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
263217	1C11-F004 CRD Drive Water PCV Bypass Could Not be Opened	2/14/2008

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

PROCEDURES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
LOP-EH-04	Shifting Pumps and Pressure Adjustment in the Electro Hydraulic Control System (EHC)	Rev. 9
LOP-EH-08	Changing EHC Fuller's Earth, Pump Discharge Duplex, and Back-up Filters	Rev. 26

WORK DOCUMENTS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
WO 1125757-0-2	M116 Main Steam – Interim Changeout of 2EH02MB, 2B EHC Duplex Filter	
WO 1137641-01 / EC 368841	Bypass the Unit 2 EHC Low Hydraulic Pressure Trip Signal at 2PA01JX	Rev. 0

CAP DOCUMENTS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
810538	Through Wall Leak in Line 0WS09AB	8/25/2008
811599	Extent of Condition of the Nonsafety WS Pipe Leak at the LSH	8/27/2008
814647	Water Leak FRM Cable Troughs into Concrete Cut Out for WS PP	9/5/2008

DRAWINGS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
M-68	P & ID Service Water System	AF

CALCULATIONS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
EC 368841	MR90(a)(4) Technical Evaluation of W/O 10913780 in Support of Maintenance of the 2A EHC Pump to Allow the Bypass of the 2B EHC Pump Trip During Swap Over from the 2A EHC Pump	Rev. 0

MISCELLANEOUS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
	Plant Status: LaSalle Plant Conditions	7/9/2008
	Personnel Safety Work Requests – Work Orders Status	7/8/2008

1R15 Operability Evaluations

PROCEDURES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
LOP-RH-01	Filling and Venting the RHR System	Rev. 40
OP-AA-108-115	Operability Evaluation OE08-003	Rev. 6
TRM 3.7.G-1	Plant Systems: Area Temperature Monitoring	Rev. 1
LOS-AA-S101	Unit 1 Shiftly Surveillance	Rev. 50

CAP DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
765918	1TE-VP079 Temp. Indication High out of LOS-AA-S101 Band.	4/22/2008
782609	1TE-VP079 Approaching TRM Limit	6/4/2008
790001	1TE-VP079 Drywell Temp Continues to Rise	6/25/2008
792505	DIV 3 DC Issues Found During Key Calc Reviews	7/1/2008
795015	Beneath Reactor Vessel Temp Exceeds TRM Limit	7/10/2008
795018	Discrepancy Noticed with TRM 3.7.G Condition B Versus Bases	7/10/2008
798182	RRC GL 2008-01 Gas Intrusion Field Activities (1E12-F340)	7/18/2008
811220	NRC GL 2008-01 Tech Evals – Fleet Wide Gaps	8/25/2008
813453	Need Confirmatory UT of Unit 1 HPCS System High Point	9/3/2008
816204	Air Pocket Detected in High Point of HPCS System Piping	9/10/2008
817402	High Lake Level	9/13/2008
817934	High River Level, Lake Blowdown Flow Control Valve Submerged	9/15/2008
819095	Lessons Learned from High Lake Level during Heavy Rain	9/17/2008
819602	Lake Blowdown Valve Data during River Flood	9/18/2008

CALCULATIONS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
4266/19AN77 (Sargent & Lundy)	Calc. for Motor Control Center (MCC) Setting for Motor Operated Valve (MOV)	Rev. 2
EC 371858	TOL Relay Setting Change for MOV 1E12-F004C	8/21/2008
EC 371494	Potential for Trapped Air in the HPCS System	Rev. 9
EC 371495	Potential for Trapped Air in the LPCS System	Rev. 9
EC 371496	Potential for Trapped Air in the RHR "A" System	Rev. 9
EC 371497	Potential for Trapped Air in the RHR "B" System	Rev. 9
EC 371498	Potential for Trapped Air in the RHR "C" System	Rev. 9
EC 371571	Potential for Trapped Air in Portions of RHR "A" & "B" Systems	Rev. 9

OPERABILITY EVALUATION

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
97040	Flooding of Turbine Building Due to Overflow of Condenser Pit with Lake Level Greater than 701' Elevation	7/30/1997
97041	Effects of Lake Level Greater than 701' Elevation on External Plant Structures	3/12/1997
97042	Effects of Flooding in Unit 1 Division 2 CSCS Pump Room on Unit 1 Division 1 CSCS Pump Room where Lake Level is Greater than 701' Elevation	3/13/1997

DRAWINGS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
ISI-RH-1002	Inservice Inspection (ISI) Isometric RHR System	Rev. A
ISI-RH-1005	ISI Isometric RHR System	Rev. A
ISI-RH-1006	ISI Isometric RHR System	Rev. A

MISCELLANEOUS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
ER-AA-600-1045	Risk Assessments of Missed or Deficient	Rev. 2

MISCELLANEOUS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
GL 2008-01	Surveillances Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems	1/11/2008
LS-SURV-01	Missed Surveillance Risk Assessment for the Units 1 and 2 Division 3 (HPCS) Battery (IR 792505) Cooling Lake Level Trend Chart	Rev. 0 9/14/08 – 9/15/08

1R18 Plant Modifications**PROCEDURES**

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
88629/L92050 Vol.J-0617	Operating Instruction for Carrier Centrifugal Refrigeration Machines	3/17/1981

DRAWINGS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
1E-1-4081AN	Schematic Diagram Primary Containment VD "VP" Water Chiller 1A Part 12	3/19/1999
1E-1-4081AN	Schematic Diagram Primary Containment VD "VP" Water Chiller 1A Part 13	2/23/2001
1E-1-4081AQ	Schematic Diagram Primary Containment VD "VP" Water Chiller 1B Part 15	2/23/2001

DRAWINGS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
EC 371742	Jumper VP Chillers Defective Chill Water Outlet Switches	Rev. 0

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing**PROCEDURES**

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
LOS-DG-M1	0 DG Fast Start, Attachment 0-Fast	10/24/2008
LOS-DG-Q3	1B(2B) DG Auxiliaries Inservice Test; Attachments B3 and B4	Rev. 51
LOS-PC-Q1	Primary Containment Isolation Valves	Rev. 40

PROCEDURES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
LOS-RH-Q1	Operability Test and ISI RHR (LPCI) and RHR Service Water Pump and Valve Inservice Test for Modes 1,2,3,4 and 5	Rev. 67
LOS-RH-Q2	RHR (LPCI) and RHR Service Water Valve Inservice Test for Operating, Startup and Hot Shutdown Conditions	Rev. 41

CAP DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
605457	2B DG Air Pressure Alarm	3/17/2007
616025	Low Air Pressure Alarm 2E22-N506	4/11/2007
802717	1RF013 Close Time > Required Action Range	8/1/2008
803468	Request CCA Be Performed on Configuration Control Events	8/4/2008
808710	1C RHR Suction Valve Tripped Thermal Overloads	8/19/2008
808859	1C RHR Suction Valve tripped Thermal Overload	8/20/2008

WORK ORDERS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
545611	Contingency for DWFD Loop Instruments	8/1/2008

MISCELLANEOUS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
	ASCO Internal Pilot Operated Solenoid Valves Technical Specification	

1R22 Surveillance Testing

PROCEDURES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
LOS-AA-S101	Unit 1 Shiftly Surveillance	Rev. 50
LOS-AA-S201	Unit 2 Shiftly Surveillance	Rev. 58
LOS-RH-Q1	RHR (LPCI) and RHR Service Water Pump and Valve Inservice Test for Modes 1, 2, 3, 4	Rev. 67

PROCEDURES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
LOS-RH-Q1	and 5 Tech Spec Surveillance: 2B RHR Att. 2B	7/2/2008
LOS-RI-Q5	Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Pump Operability, Valve Inservice tests in Modes 1,2,3 and Cold Quick Start; Attachment 1A	Rev. 28
LOS-SC-Q1	2B SLC Pump Qtrly Att. 2B	9/5/2008
LOS-SC-Q1	SLC Pump Operability/Inservice Test and Explosive Valve Continuity Check	8/5/2008
LOS-VC-SR1	Control Room and Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room HVAC Pressurization Surveillance	8/12/2008

CAP DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
745140	SLC Test Tank (2C41-A002) Requires Flushing IAW LOP-SC-07	3/5/2008
816217	Design Eng to Eval Max opening Size in CRE after DP Test	9/15/2008

WORK ORDERS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
1017479	"A" VC System DP Test	9/4/2008
1017480	"B" VC System DP Test	9/4/2008

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

MISCELLANEOUS

ESG 93	Out of the Box Training Scenario	9/2008
ESG 94	Out of the Box Training Scenario	9/2008

20S1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas

CAP DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
758197	L1R12 Steam Affected Dose 8.579 Person-Rem Over Estimate	4/2/2008
785091	Operator Is Contaminated During Hanging of Clearance Order	6/10/2008
786202	Need to Lower Dose Rates in Unit 2 Reactor Building 673 and 694 North	6/13/2008
793324	Limiting Use of Danger Locked High Radiation Area Master Keys	7/3/2008
804553	Personnel Contamination Discovered at Radiologically Restricted Area Exit	8/6/2008
806465	Procedure Guidance Does Not Conform with ODCM Section 2.3	8/12/2008
907817	High Radiation Area Found While Performing Routine Survey	8/16/2008

MISCELLANEOUS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
LS-AA-126-1001	Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas and ALARA Planning and Controls Self-Assessment Report	1/30/2008
NF-AA-390	Spent Fuel Pool Material Control	Rev. 2

20S2 ALARA Planning and Controls

PROCEDURES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
RP-AA-270	Prenatal Radiation Exposure	Rev. 3
RP-AA-401	ALARA Post-Job review L1R12 Safety Relief Valve Activities	2/23/2008
	L1R12 Refueling Outage Report	2/2008

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

PROCEDURES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
NEI 99-02	Performance Indicators	Rev. 5

CAP DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
727701	Turbine Control Valve 1 LVDT 1 Connection Degraded	1/28/2008
744657	14A Heater Normal Drain Controller	3/4/2008
768445	Received EHC Minor Alarm CV #4 LVDT Fault	4/28/2008

MISCELLANEOUS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
LS-AA-2090	Monthly Data Elements for NRC Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity	Rev. 4
LS-AA-2030	Monthly Data Elements for NRC Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours	Rev. 5
LS-AA-2010	Monthly Data Elements for NRC/WANO Unit/Reactor Shutdown Occurrences	Rev. 5
1Q/2008 PI	1Q/2008 Performance Indicators – La Salle 1	7/22/2008
1Q/2008 PI	1Q/2008 Performance Indicators – La Salle 2	7/22/2008
LS-AA-126-1005	Reactor Coolant System Activity Check-In Self-Assessment Report	3/5/2008
LS-AA-2140	Monthly Data Elements for Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness	Rev. 4
LS-AA-2150	Monthly Data Elements for RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrences	Rev. 5

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

PROCEDURES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
LGA-RI-101	Unit 1 Alternate Vessel Injection using RCIC including Defeat of RCIC Isolations	Rev. 3
LGA-RI-103	Unit 1 RPV Injection using RCIC when Loss of DC is Imminent or has Occurred	Rev. 1
LOA-AP-101	Unit 1, AC Power System Abnormal	Rev. 30
LOP-CM-02	Startup, Operation and Shutdown of Post-LOCA Primary Containment Atmosphere Hydrogen and Oxygen Monitoring System	Rev. 27
LOP-GC-02	Adding Makeup Water to Generator Stator Cooling System (GC)	Rev. 11
LOP-RT-05	Reactor Water Cleanup System Filter/Demineralizer Backwash	Rev. 38
OP-AA-102-103	Operator Work-Around Program	Rev. 1

CAP DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
517613 – Assign. 9	Revise procedures to support Riverbend Seismic OPEX	9/21/2006
517613 – Assign. 17	Revise Isolation Interlock Defeat Methodology in LGAs	5/18/2007
517613 – Assign. 33	Implement OP-AA-103-105 and Rev. 24 of LOP-AA-04.	4/6/2007
517613 – Assign. 36	Revise LGA-HD-101/201 for PRA	6/1/2007
517613 – Assign. 39	Revise Post Op Auth Procedures for EC 357861 Procedures LOA-IA-201, LOA-OG-201, LOP-HW-03M and LOP-HW-04M	6/22/2007
517613 – Assign. 40	Revise post Op Auth Procedures for EC 364867	6/29/2007
517613 – Assign. 43	Revise procedures for Post LOCA H2 Indication Fix EC 365109 will replace the recorder scales for H2 recorder or put in new recorders	8/10/2007
517613 – Assign. 44	LOA-FP-001 revise and approve for distribution.	5/10/2007
517613 – Assign. 48	Revise LOP-VE-01 for EC 365986	9/7/2007
517613 – Assign. 65	Revise as necessary the EOP Support Procs and EOP Flowcharts for Calc L-003317	3/14/2008
650784	CDBI – Manual Suction Swap in RCIC Black Start Too Late	7/12/2007
608495	Maintenance Rework-GC Vacuum Breaker	3/24/2007

CAP DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
608495 – Assign. 2	Leaking Past Seat To Evaluate and Implement as appropriate actions to address the condition prior to a refueling outage	4/26/2007
718764	B/W won't Advance to to LVL Switch or Vacuum in Vessel	1/7/2008
774168	Long term degraded condition no resolution	5/10/2008
779879	Unit 1 "A" OG Recombiner Inlet Temperature Reads Upscale	5/27/2008
795493	Chronic Repeat Event-VL Compressor Trips on High Oil Temp	7/11/2008
812327	Can't Maintain Corrected Flow when Switch in Auto Position	8/29/2008
814201	FP FASA Entry Conditions for Safe Shutdown Procedures	9/4/2008
814237	FP FASA IR 364029 – Required Action Not Completed	2/7/2008

MISCELLANEOUS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
	Operator Workarounds and Challenges	8/4/2008

4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

PROCEDURES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
LER	HPCS System Declared Inoperable Due to	8/8/2008
05000374/2008001-00	Failed Room Ventilation Supply Fan	
MA-AA-716-210	Performance Centered Maintenance Process	Rev. 7
MA-AA-716-210-1002	Exelon Motor Maintenance Logic Tree	Rev. 3

CAP DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
AR 785154-15-02	Licensee Extent of Condition review for Applicable 480VAC Motors	9/5/2008
785154	2VD05C Tripped	6/11/2008
785154 Assign. 3	EACE – Investigate 2VD05C tripped	7/10/2008

MAIN CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR LOGS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
6/11/2008 6:21:24 A.M.	Rolled Forward Entry	6/11/2008

VENDOR MANUAL

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
	Baldor-Reliance Integral Horsepower AC Induction Motors Installation & Operating Manual	2/2007
EPRI 1003095	Electric Motor Tiered Maintenance Program	8/2002
EPRI NP-7502s	Electric Motor Predictive and Preventive Maintenance Guide	7/1992

MISCELLANEOUS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
EN #44284	Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet	6/11/2008
EPRI 1000898	Random Wound Motor Failure Investigation Technical Evaluation	12/2000
EQ-LS067	Reliance Electric Company Ventilation Fan Motors Justification and Analysis	Rev. 15
Figure 128-2	HPCS Switchgear and Pump Room ventilation System	2/2003
FOR ZVD05C	Work History Report by System	9/17/2008

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ALARA	As-Low-As-Is-Reasonably-Achievable
CAP	Corrective Action Program
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CRD	Control Rod Drive
CSCS	Core Standby Cooling System
CW	Circulating Water
DG	Diesel Generator
EHC	Electro-Hydraulic Control
EPRI	Electric Power Research Institute
HPCS	High Pressure Core Spray
IP	Inspection Procedure
ISI	Inservice Inspection
LOCA	Loss of Coolant Accident
LPCI	Low Pressure Coolant Injection
LPCS	Low Pressure Core Spray
MOV	Motor-Operated Valve
MRFF	Maintenance Rule Functional Failure
NEI	Nuclear Energy Institute
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ODCM	Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
OWA	Operator Workaround
PARS	Publicly Available Records
PI	Performance Indicator
PMT	Post-Maintenance Testing
RCIC	Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
RCS	Reactor Coolant System
RETS	Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications
RHR	Residual Heat Removal
RHRSW	Residual Heat Removal Service Water
RWP	Radiation Work Permit
SLC	Standby Liquid Control
TS	Technical Specification
UFSAR	Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
USAR	Updated Safety Analysis Report
UHS	Ultimate Heat Sink
VD	Ventilation System
VP	Containment Ventilation
WO	Work Order